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Abstract
In a point-to-point communication system which consists of a sender, a receiver and a set of noiseless channels, the sender
wishes to transmit a private message to the receiver through the channels which may be eavesdropped by a wiretapper. The set
of wiretap sets is arbitrary. The wiretapper can access any one but not more than one wiretap set. From each wiretap set, the
wiretapper can obtain some partial information about the private message which is measured by the equivocation of the message
given the symbols obtained by the wiretapper. The security strategy is to encode the message with some random key at the sender.
Only the message is required to be recovered at the receiver. Under this setting, we define an achievable rate tuple consisting of
the size of the message, the size of the key, and the equivocation for each wiretap set. We first prove a tight rate region when
both the message and the key are required to be recovered at the receiver. Then we extend the result to the general case when
only the message is required to be recovered at the receiver. Moreover, we show that even if stochastic encoding is employed at
the sender, the message rate cannot be increased.
Index Terms
Imperfect secrecy, secret sharing, secure network coding, wiretap channel II.
I. INTRODUCTION
SHANNON launched information-theoretic security in his seminal paper [10], where a sender wishes to transmit a privatemessage to a receiver with the existence of a wiretapper. The model, referred to as the Shannon cipher system, requires
that the wiretapper can obtain no information about the message. In this paper, we refer to it as perfect security for ease of
discussion. To protect the message, the sender encodes the message with a random key which is shared with the receiver a
priori but unknown to the wiretapper. The sender transmits the encrypted message in a public channel to the receiver such
that the receiver can recover the message from the key and the encrypted message, while the wiretapper who observes the
encrypted message only can obtain no information about the private message. The conclusion in [10], known as the perfect
secrecy theorem, states that the size of the key can not be less than the size of the message if perfect security is required.
Throughout this paper, the size of a random variable is measured by its Shannon entropy. A recent result by Ho et al. in [5]
proved a stronger bound with the additional assumption that the key is independent of the message: in the Shannon cipher
system, the size of the key is lower bounded by the logarithm of the cardinality of the support of the message alphabet.
Secret sharing was studied by by Blakley [1] and Shamir [9], where an even complex model was introduced. Ozarow and
Wyner [7] also studied a similar model which they called the wiretap channel II. In their model, information is sent to the
receiver through a set of noiseless point-to-point channels. It is assumed that the wiretapper can access any one but not more
than one set of channels, called a wiretap set, out of a collection A of all possible wiretap sets, where A is specified by the
problem under consideration. In [7], A consists of all the subsets of the channel set with size r. The strategy to protect the
private message is the same as that in the Shannon cipher system, namely that a key is employed to randomize the message.
Specifically, they proved a lower bound on the size of the key which can be attained by a linear code 1. This result is further
generalized in Cheng and Yeung [3] for an arbitrary A. They proved a lower bound on the size of the key and showed that it
can be also achieved by a linear code.
Imperfect secrecy was independently studied by Yamamoto [12] and Yeung [13] (p. 116). The communication model in [13]
is the same as the model described in the Shannon cipher system, except that the wiretapper may obtain partial information
about the message, which is measured by the mutual information between the message and the symbols obtained by the
wiretapper. The imperfect secrecy theorem states that this mutual information is lower bounded by the difference between the
size of the message and the size of the key. In [12], an inequality equivalent to the imperfect secrecy theorem was used in
the proof of converse coding theorems for a multiterminal secrecy system. When imperfect security is considered in a wiretap
network G = (V, E), where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of channels, Cai and Yeung [2] proved two tight bounds,
one on the minimum size of the key and the other on the maximum size of the message, provided that the collection A of all
possible wiretap sets consists of all subsets of E with size r and the information leakage about the message for each wiretap
set is at most i log q, where i is a fixed integer satisfying 0 ≤ i ≤ r and q is the size of the alphabet.
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1The coding scheme in [7] was called a group code, which can be represented as a linear code. See [8] [6] for details.
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Fig. 1. Imperfect Wiretap Channel II.
Xu and Chen [11] studied how to communicate securely over a network in which each channel may be noisy or noiseless.
Their model is a single-source single-sink acyclic planar network without network coding and the communication between
the source and the sink is subject to non-cooperative eavesdropping on each link, namely A consists of all the subsets of
the channel set with a single channel. From each wiretap set in A, the wiretapper can obtain partial information about the
message, which is measured by the equivocation of the confidential message given the symbols obtained by the wiretapper.
They defined an achievable rate tuple consisting of the message rate, the key rate and the equivocation rate for each wiretap
set. They proved sufficient conditions in terms of the communication rates and the network parameters for provably secure
communication, along with an intuitive and efficient coding scheme. Furthermore, the derived achievable rate region is tight
for several special cases. In the following, we refer to this model as the non-cooperative imperfect secrecy system.
In this work, we introduce a security model which generalizes the model in [7]. The communication model is the same
as that in [7]. The main difference is that in our model A is arbitrary, and from each wiretap set in A, the wiretapper can
obtain some information about the message. On the other hand, our model subsumes the noiseless case of the model in [11],
since the communication in a single-source single-sink network without network coding can be simplified as a point-to-point
system. We also define an achievable rate tuple similar to that in [11] and a tight rate region is proved under this setting.
The rest is organized as follows. First, we present the problem formulation and introduce some related results in Section II.
Then we present our main result on the rate region in Section III. Before proving the main result, we first establish an achievable
subregion in Section IV with the additional requirement that the key is also recovered by the receiver. The main result is proved
in Section V. In Section VI, we show that the message rate cannot be increased by introducing stochastic encoding at the
sender.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RELATED RESULT
A. Problem Formulation
The communication model (depicted in Fig. 1) in our problem is described as follows:
• The communication is between a transmitter s and a receiver t, which are connected by a set of point-to-point noiseless
channels. Let E = {e1, e2, ..., eh} be the set of channels and h = |E|. Symbols transmitted on the channels are taken from
a common alphabet F with |F| = q. For each channel ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ h, the channel capacity is Ci log q, where Ci is an
integer. Denote the symbols transmitted on ei by Yei .
• The message M is generated at the transmitter s according to a uniform distribution on the message set M. The key K,
also generated at the transmitter s, takes value in an alphabet K according to the uniform distribution, and is independent
of M , i.e.,
I(M ;K) = 0. (1)
Besides K, no additional randomization is allowed inside the network. The transmitter needs to send the ciphertext
(encrypted message) to the receiver and the receiver needs to recover the message with zero error. Note that the key is
only known to the sender. The rates of the message and the key are defined as follows.
RM =
H(M)
log q
; (2)
3RK =
H(K)
log q
. (3)
• Let A be the set of wiretap sets and |A| = d. Each wiretapper can access at most one wiretap set in A. Assume that the
wiretapper knows the encoding and decoding functions but not the private key K.
• For each wiretap set Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, let YIi be the symbols transmitted in Ii. It is required that the wiretapper’s equivocation
H(M |YIi) is lower bounded by a given constant Ri log q, namely
H(M |YIi)
log q
≥ Ri. (4)
The achievable rate tuple is defined as follows.
Definition 1. The encoder is a function f such that
f :M×K →
h∏
i=1
FCi . (5)
The decoder is a function g such that
g :
h∏
i=1
FCi →M. (6)
The corresponding rate tuple (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) is an achievable rate tuple if f and g satisfy that:
1) For all m1,m2 ∈M with m1 6= m2,
f(m1, k1) 6= f(m2, k2), (7)
for all k1, k2 ∈ K. This guarantees that any two messages are distinguishable at the receiver; i.e.,
g(f(m, k)) = m,
for all k.
2) The constraints (4) holds for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d.
Next, we define the achievable rate tuple by a block code in terms of M , K and YIi , 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Definition 2. A rate tuple of (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) is achievable by block codes if there exists a sequence of (Mn,Kn) such
that
RM = lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Mn|
log q
; (8)
RK = lim
n→∞
1
n
log |Kn|
log q
; (9)
Ri ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(Mn|YIi,n)
log q
, 1 ≤ i ≤ d; (10)
where Mn ∈Mn ⊆Mn, Kn ∈ Kn ⊆ Kn, and YIi,n ∈ Fn.
The inequality (10) means that, for any positive real number ε, there exists a positive integer n0 such that
Ri − ε ≤ 1
n
H(Mn|YIi,n)
log q
for all n ≥ n0.
The rate region R is defined as the set of all achievable rate tuples (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d). In the sequel, we refer to this
model as the cooperative imperfect secrecy system.
In the sequel, we assume that the base of the logarithm in the entropy quantities (e.g.,H(X), I(X;Y )) is q, so that the
factor (log q)−1 can be omitted in (2)-(10).
B. Related Result
1) Perfect and Imperfect Secrecy: The perfect secrecy theorem in [10] is stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Perfect Secrecy Theorem). Let X be the plaintext, Y be the ciphertext, and K be the key in a secret key
cryptosystem. If perfect secrecy is achieved, i.e., I(X;Y ) = 0, then
H(K) ≥ H(X). (11)
4For a network G=(V, E), we denote a cut of G by (W,W c), where W ⊆ V contains the source node s and W c = V \W
contains the destination node t, and refer to the set of edges from W to W c as the cut-set.
For the wiretap network model [2], the following result related to the perfect secrecy theorem was proved.
Theorem 2. In a wiretap network, let K be the key and YI be the symbols transmitted in wiretap set I . Then
H(K) ≥ H(YI). (12)
If I is contained in a cut-set W , then
H(M) ≤ H(YW\I |YI). (13)
As a generalization of the perfect secrecy theorem, the imperfect secrecy theorem in [13] (p. 116) is stated below.
Theorem 3 (Imperfect Secrecy Theorem). Let X be the plaintext, Y be the ciphertext, and K be the key in a secret key
cryptosystem. Then
I(X;Y ) ≥ H(X)−H(K). (14)
In the above theorem, if I(X;Y ) = 0, then (14) becomes (11), i.e., the theorem reduces to the perfect secrecy theorem. In
[12], it was proved that for any secret key cryptosystem,
H(K) ≥ H(X|Y ), (15)
which is equivalent to (14).
2) Secure Coding over Routing Networks: The system model in [11] is a single-source single-sink directed acyclic network
with the assumption that each wiretapper can access only one channel and there is no network coding in the network. Each
channel in the network may be noisy or noiseless.
When all the channels in the network are noiseless, the network can be simplified as a point-to-point communication system,
in which each channel is a path from the source node to the destination node in the original network and the set of wiretap
sets A is arbitrary. Hence our model subsumes the non-cooperative model for this special case.
In [11], an achievable rate region of rate tuples was obtained for noisy channels, and the region was shown to be tight for
several special cases. Based on the achievable rate region, they also gave an algorithm for constructing a secure code on the
network.
The achievable rate region for noiseless channels is stated below.
Theorem 4 (Theorem 2, [11]). A rate tuple (RM , RK , Re), e ∈ E , is achievable if
0 ≤ Re ≤ RM
for all e ∈ E and there exist auxiliary numbers re such that
0 ≤ re ≤ RM + RK ;
0 ≤ RM + RK ≤ min
Cut
∑
e∈ECut
re;
0 ≤ re ≤ Ce;
Re ≤ RM + RK − re.
In the above, Re and Ce correspond to Ri and Ci in our formulation respectively; ECut is the set of channels across a given
cut Cut.
III. THE RATE REGION
The main result of this paper is a characterization of the rate region R given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5. A rate tuple (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) is in R if and only if
RM ≥ Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ d; (16)
and there exist ri’s such that
RK ≥
h∑
i=1
ri −RM ; (17)
RM ≤
h∑
i=1
ri; (18)
0 ≤ ri ≤ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ h; (19)
0 ≤ Rj ≤
∑
ei∈I¯j
ri, 1 ≤ j ≤ d, (20)
5where I¯j = E \ Ij .
Our model is a generalization of the wiretap channel II studied in [7], because here we consider imperfect secrecy instead
of perfect secrecy. By letting A = {A : A ⊆ E , and |A| = r}, we can recover the result in [7]. Before proving Theorem 5,
we first study a subregion of R.
IV. A SUBREGION OF THE RATE REGION
By requiring both the message and the key to be recovered at the receiver, we can define a subregion R′ of the rate region
R. The definition of R′ is given below.
Definition 3. The encoder is a function f such that
f :M×K →
h∏
i=1
FCi . (21)
The decoder is a function g such that
g :
h∏
i=1
FCi →M×K. (22)
The corresponding rate tuple (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) is a K-achievable rate tuple if g ◦ f is the identity function and (4) holds
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , d.
The rate region R′ is defined as the set of all K-achievable rate tuples (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d). The region R′ is characterized
as follows.
Theorem 6. A rate tuple (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) is in R′ if and only if
RM ≥ Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ d; (23)
Ri ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ d; (24)
RK ≥ 0; (25)
and there exist ri’s such that
RM =
h∑
i=1
ri −RK ; (26)
0 ≤ ri ≤ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ h; (27)∑
ei∈Ij
ri ≤ RK + RM −Rj , 1 ≤ j ≤ d. (28)
A. Converse
In this section, we prove that if (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) ∈ R′, then the constraints (23)-(28) hold. Since the converse is valid
for both single-shot coding (n = 1) and block coding (n ≥ 1), we prove it only for single-shot coding for simplicity. The
constraints (24) and (25) are obvious.
We first prove the constraint (23). By the constraint (4),
Ri ≤ H(M |YIi) ≤ H(M) = RM . (29)
Hence the constraints (23)-(25) hold.
Let us consider an equivalent condition of the constraint (4). For all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, let
ci = RM −Ri = H(M)−Ri. (30)
The constraint (4) is equivalent to
I(YIi ;M) ≤ H(M)−Ri,
or
0 ≤ I(YIi ;M) ≤ ci. (31)
By (29) and (30),
0 ≤ ci ≤ RM .
Next, we prove a lemma which generalizes the inequality (12) in Theorem 2.
6Lemma 1. In a cooperative imperfect secrecy system, let M be the message, K be the key and YI be the symbols transmitted
in wiretap set I . Then
I(YI ;M) ≥ H(YI)−H(K). (32)
Proof: Since I(M ;K) = 0 and H(YI |M,K) = 0,
I(YI ;M) = H(YI)−H(YI |M)
≥ H(YI)−H(YI ,K|M)
= H(YI)−H(K|M)−H(YI |K,M)
= H(YI)−H(K|M)
= H(YI)−H(K).
In the next theorem, we prove the constraints (26), (27), and (28).
Lemma 2. For any tuple (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) ∈ R′, there exist ri’s such that
RM =
h∑
i=1
ri −RK ;
0 ≤ ri ≤ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ h;∑
ei∈Ij
ri ≤ RK + RM −Rj , 1 ≤ j ≤ d.
Proof: By Lemma 1 and the inequality (31), for each wiretap set Ii,
H(YIi)−H(K) ≤ I(YIi ;M) ≤ ci,
or
H(YIi) ≤ H(K) + ci = RK + ci. (33)
For each channel ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ h,
H(Yei) ≤ Ci. (34)
Since Y(ei:1≤i≤h) is a function of (M,K) and (M,K) can be recovered by Y(ei:1≤i≤h),
H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h)) = H(M,K) = H(M) + H(K). (35)
Hence,
H(M) = H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h))−H(K),
which is equivalent to
RM = H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h))−RK . (36)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h, let
ri = H(Yei |Y(e1,e2,...,ei−1)).
Then for all Ij , 1 ≤ j ≤ d,
ri ≤ H(Yei |Y(el:el∈Ij ,l<i)).
Furthermore,
RM = H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h))−RK
=
h∑
i=1
H(Yei |Y(e1,e2,...,ei−1))−RK
=
h∑
i=1
ri −RK ;
0 ≤ ri ≤ H(Yei) ≤ Ci;
7∑
ei∈Ij
ri ≤
∑
ei∈Ij
H(Yei |Y(el:el∈Ij ,l<i))
= H(YIj )
≤ RK + cj
= RK + RM −Rj , 1 ≤ j ≤ d,
which completes the proof.
B. Achievability
In this section, we prove that (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) ∈ R′ if there exists (r1, r2, ..., rh) such that the constraints (23)-(28)
are satisfied.
In the following, a special code in which the symbols sent on the channels are mutually independent is studied. We design
a block code with length n as follows. The sender generates M and K at rates RM and RK , respectively, and sends symbols
on each channel ei (1 ≤ i ≤ h) at rate ri. Next, we prove that the tuple (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) can be attained by a linear code.
Let the symbols on channel ei (1 ≤ i ≤ h) be Yei . For simplicity, assume that the quantities ci (Recall the definition in
(30)), Ci, RM , RK , and ri are all rational numbers, so that there is a sufficiently large n such that
c′i = nci; (37)
C ′i = nCi; (38)
nM = nRM = nH(M); (39)
nK = nRK = nH(K); (40)
ni = nri = nH(Yei), 1 ≤ i ≤ h (41)
are all integers. Thus, by (26), (27), and (28), nM , nK , and (n1, n2, ..., nh) satisfy
nM =
h∑
i=1
ni − nK ; (42)
0 ≤ ni ≤ C ′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ h; (43)∑
ej∈Ii
nj ≤ nK + c′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d. (44)
For a matrix A, we write the number of rows and columns of A as row(A) and col(A), respectively. The following two
lemmas are instrumental in the subsequent proofs.
Lemma 3. Let Fq be a finite field of size q, A, B be given matrices with the same number of rows and (A,B) be the
concatenated matrix of A and B. Let Y = AM + BK, where rank(A,B) = row(A,B). If M and K are uniformly
distributed on Fmq and F
k
q , respectively, and I(M ;K) = 0, then
I(Y ;M) = rank(A,B)− rank(B).
Proof:
I(Y ;M) = H(Y )−H(Y |M)
= H(Y )−H(AM + BK|M)
= H(Y )−H(BK|M)
= H(Y )−H(BK)
= rank(A,B)− rank(B).
Lemma 4 (Lemma 3, [2]). Let V1, V2, ..., Vm be vector subspaces in Fnq , and dim(Vi) = di (1 ≤ i ≤ m). If d ≥ 0
and d + di ≤ n (1 ≤ i ≤ m), then for q > m, there exists a vector subspace V of Fnq , such that dim(V ) = d and
dim(V ⊕ Vi) = dim(V ) + dim(Vi) (1 ≤ i ≤ m).
Proof: Let {b1, b2, ..., bd} be a basis of V . For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let {vi1, vi2, ..., vidi} be a maximally independent set of
vectors in Vi. We construct {b1, b2, ..., bd} by induction. It suffices to show that for 1 ≤ j ≤ d, if b1, b2, ..., bj−1 have been
chosen such that for all Vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi (45)
8are linearly independent, then it is possible to choose bj such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
b1, b2, ..., bj−1, bj , vi1, vi2, ..., vidi (46)
are linearly independent. Specifically, bj is chosen such that it is independent of the set of vectors in (45) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
i.e.,
bj ∈ Fnq \ ∪1≤i≤m〈b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi〉. (47)
Since the cardinality of a subspace in Fnq is finite, we need to show that the set above is nonempty. Toward this end, consider∣∣∣∣ ⋃
1≤i≤m
〈b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi〉
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
1≤i≤m
∣∣∣∣〈b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi〉∣∣∣∣
=
∑
1≤i≤m
qdi+j−1
≤
∑
1≤i≤m
qn−1 (for di + j ≤ di + d ≤ n)
= mqn−1.
Therefore, ∣∣∣∣Fnq \ ⋃
1≤i≤m
〈b1, b2, ..., bj−1, vi1, vi2, ..., vidi〉
∣∣∣∣
≥ qn −mqn−1
= qn−1(q −m)
> 0,
since q > m. Hence bj can be chosen for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m.
The remaining of this subsection is largely about the following theorem.
Theorem 7. When q > |A| is a prime power, if the integer tuple (n1, n2, ..., nh) satisfies (42)-(44), then there exists a linear
code such that H(Mn) = nM and H(Kn) = nK .
Proof: The code can be constructed as follows. Let the finite field Fq be the common alphabet of M , K and all the
channels. The symbols transmitted on channel ei (1 ≤ i ≤ h) is taken from Fniq , which means there are ni symbols from Fq
transmitted on ei. Let x1, x2, ..., xnM+nK be all the symbols to send, where the first n1 symbols are sent on e1, the next
n2 symbols are sent on e2, so on and so forth, and the last nh symbols are sent on eh. We construct xi’s according to their
positions in the sequence.
Generate nK mutually independent symbols K = (k1, k2, ..., knK ) from Fq . Transmit K at the first nK positions, i.e.,
xi = ki = bi ·K, 1 ≤ i ≤ nK , (48)
where
bi = (0, 0, ..., 0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
1, 0, ..., 0). (49)
Then generate nM (=
∑h
i=1 ni − nK) mutually independent message symbols (m1,m2, ...,mnM ) from Fq . For the remaining
nM positions in ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ h, transmit the encrypted message with the encoding
xi = mi−nK + biK, nK + 1 ≤ i ≤ nK + nM , (50)
where bi ∈ FnKq is a row vector to be determined in the following steps.
We need to construct {bi : nK + 1 ≤ i ≤ nK + nM} such that:
(a) Both M and K can be recovered at node t.
(b) The constraint (31) (which is equivalent to (4)) holds for all the wiretap sets.
From the previous discussion, we can see that receiver t can recover K from the symbols in the first nK positions, and by
(50), M can be also recovered via
mi−nK = xi − biK, nK + 1 ≤ i ≤ nK + nM .
9Hence, the condition (a) is satisfied by any choice of bi’s. Moreover, it can readily be seen that xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ nK + nM are
mutually independent.
In matrix form, (48) and (50) can be written as
x1
x2
...
xnM+nK
 = ( A B )( MK
)
,
where
(
A B
)
=

0 InK×nK
bnK+1
InM×nM ...
bnK+nM
 . (51)
In the above, 0 is an nK × nM zero matrix and InK×nK is an nK × nK identity matrix. Recall that the symbols obtained in
wiretap set Ii = {ei1 , ei2 , ..., ei|Ii|} are YIi , 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Then
YIi =

xi1
xi2
...
xi|Ii|
 = (AIi |BIi)( MnKn
)
,
where AIi and BIi are the corresponding sub-matrices of A and B, respectively.
We now derive a sufficient condition for (31) to be satisfied. This condition will be used for the construction of bi’s. Since
x1, x2, ..., xnM+nK are mutually independent,
rank(AIi , BIi) = row(AIi , BIi) =
∑
ej∈Ii
nj . (52)
By Lemma 3,
I(YIi ;M) = rank(AIi , BIi)− rank(BIi)
=
∑
ej∈Ii
nj − rank(BIi).
The constraint (31) is equivalent to
I(YIi ;M) ≤ nci = c′i. (53)
Hence, it is sufficient to construct BIi such that ∑
ej∈Ii
nj − rank(BIi) ≤ c′i,
or
rank(BIi) ≥
∑
ej∈Ii
nj − c′i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d. (54)
For
∑
ej∈Ii nj , by (44), we obtain that ∑
ej∈Ii
nj − c′i ≤ nK = col(BIi). (55)
By (52), ∑
ej∈Ii
nj − c′i = row(AIi , BIi)− c′i (56)
= row(BIi)− c′i (57)
≤ row(BIi). (58)
In summary, by (55) and (58), we have ∑
ej∈Ii
nj − c′i ≤ min{row(BIi), col(BIi)}. (59)
10
In order for (54) to be satisfied, in light of (59), it suffices to construct bi’s such that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
rank(BIi) = min{row(BIi), col(BIi)}
= min{
∑
ej∈Ii
nj , nK}, (60)
i.e., BIi is full rank.
The row vectors bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ nK , have been defined according to (49). In the following, we will construct bj , nK + 1 ≤
j ≤ nK + nM , iteratively. For each wiretap set Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ d and for each j, 1 ≤ j ≤ nK + nM , let
Y jIi =

xi1
xi2
...
xil
 = (AjIi |BjIi)( MK
)
,
where xil ’s are the symbols in Ii such that 1 ≤ il ≤ j. Thus, Y jIi is a sub-vector of YIi up to the jth row and A
j
Ii
and BjIi
are the corresponding sub-matrices of AIi and BIi , respectively. Also, Y
j
Ii
, AjIi and B
j
Ii
are sub-vectors of Y j+1Ii , A
j+1
Ii
and
Bj+1Ii , respectively. When j = nM + nK , Y
j
Ii
= YIi , A
j
Ii
= AIi and B
j
Ii
= BIi . If we can find bj , 1 ≤ j ≤ nK + nM , such
that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
rank(BjIi) = min{row(B
j
Ii
), col(BjIi)}, (61)
then for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d, the equality (60) holds by letting j = nK + nM in (61).
For 1 ≤ j ≤ nK , since BjIi is a sub-matrix of the nK × nK identity matrix InK×nK ,
rank(BjIi) = row(B
j
Ii
),
which implies (61).
Assume that for j equal to some l ≥ nK , we have successfully constructed {bi : 1 ≤ i ≤ l} such that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
rank(BlIi) = min{row(BlIi), col(BlIi)} (62)
Now in order for (62) to be satisfied with l + 1 in place of l, we need to choose bl+1 such that for each wiretap set Ii
(1 ≤ i ≤ d) containing xl+1, if row(BlIi) < nK , then
rank(Bl+1Ii ) = rank(B
l
Ii) + 1.
The existence of bl+1 is guaranteed by Lemma 4 provided q > d. Then by mathematical induction, bj , nK+1 ≤ j ≤ nK+nM ,
can be chosen as required.
Hence, bj’s are successfully constructed, which completes the proof.
For each wiretap set Ii, let I¯i = E \ Ii. The rate region in Theorem 6 can be rewritten as follows.
Corollary 1. A rate tuple (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) is in R′ if and only if
RM ≥ Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ d; (63)
and there exist ri’s such that
RK =
h∑
i=1
ri −RM ; (64)
RM ≤
h∑
i=1
ri; (65)
0 ≤ ri ≤ Ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ h; (66)
0 ≤ Rj ≤
∑
ei∈I¯j
ri, 1 ≤ j ≤ d. (67)
By comparing the constraints (63)-(67) for R′ and the constraints (16)-(20) for R, we see that they are identical except
that (64) and (17) are different. Specifically, (64) is obtained from (17) by setting the inequality therein to equality. In R′,
when Ci’s are fixed, ri, RM , RK , and Rj’s are all bounded. However, in R, though ri, RM and Rj’s are bounded, RK can
be arbitrarily large. Therefore, R′ ( R in general. However, we will show in Corollary 2 at the end of the next section that
requiring K to be reconstructed at the receiver by no means impairs the performance of the coding scheme.
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V. THE GENERAL RATE REGION
In this section, we prove Theorem 5. First, we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 5. In a cooperative imperfect secrecy system, let M be the message and YI be the symbols transmitted in wiretap set
I . Then
H(M |YI) ≤ H(YI¯ |YI), (68)
where I¯ = E \ I .
Proof: Since E = I ∪ I¯ and M is a function of YE ,
H(M |YE) = 0. (69)
Hence,
H(M |YI) = H(M |YI , YI¯) + I(M ;YI¯ |YI)
= I(M ;YI¯ |YI)
≤ H(YI¯ |YI),
which completes the proof.
In this lemma, if we let I(M ;YI) = 0, then the inequality (68) reduces to
H(M) ≤ H(YI¯ |YI), (70)
which is the inequality (13) in Theorem 2.
A. Converse
The constraints (16) and the left hand side of (20) can be proved by the the same method in Section IV-A. Let us focus on
the remaining constraints.
Since Y(ei:1≤i≤h) is a function of (M,K),
H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h)) ≤ H(M,K) = H(M) + H(K).
Hence,
H(K) ≥ H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h))−H(M),
which is equivalent to
RK ≥ H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h))−RM . (71)
Since M can be recovered from Y(ei:1≤i≤h),
H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h)) ≥ H(M),
which is equivalent to
RM ≤ H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h)). (72)
For any wiretap set Ii, 1 ≤ i ≤ d,
Y(ei:1≤i≤h) = Y(Ii,I¯i).
By the constraint (4) and Lemma 5, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ d,
Rj ≤ H(M |YIj ) ≤ H(YI¯j |YIj ). (73)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h, let
ri = H(Yei |Y(e1,e2,...,ei−1)).
Then
ri ≤ H(Yei |Y(el:el∈Ij ,l<i)).
Furthermore, (71) implies
RK ≥ H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h))−RM
=
h∑
i=1
H(Yei |Y(e1,e2,...,ei−1))−RM
=
h∑
i=1
ri −RM ,
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and (72) implies
RM ≤ H(Y(ei:1≤i≤h))
=
h∑
i=1
H(Yei |Y(e1,e2,...,ei−1))
=
h∑
i=1
ri.
Also,
0 ≤ ri ≤ H(Yei) ≤ Ci.
Finally, (73) implies
Rj ≤ H(YI¯j |YIj )
=
∑
ei∈I¯j
H(Yei |Y(el:l<i), YIj )
≤
∑
ei∈I¯j
H(Yei |Y(el:l<i))
=
∑
ei∈I¯j
ri.
Hence, we prove all the constraints in (16)-(20).
B. Achievability
In the above converse, the only constraint on RK is
RK ≥
h∑
i=1
ri −RM .
Let RˆK =
h∑
i=1
ri−RM and fix RM and Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ d. From the discussion in Section IV-B, the rate tuple (RM , RˆK , Ri:1≤i≤d)
can be attained. Then (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d) can be attained by discarding RK − RˆK bits of the key before constructing a code
for (RM , RˆK , Ri:1≤i≤d). Hence we have the following corollary, which shows that requiring K to be reconstructed by at the
receiver by no means impairs the performance of the coding scheme.
Corollary 2. Fix RM and Ri:1≤i≤d in a rate tuple (RM , RK , Ri:1≤i≤d), if RK is minimized then K can be recovered by the
receiver.
VI. STOCHASTIC ENCODER
We have already established the rate region when the encoding at the sender is deterministic, i.e., the information symbols
on all the channels are a function of M and K. In this section, in stead of the deterministic encoder, a stochastic encoder
is employed at the sender, where the information symbols on all the channels are no longer a function of M and K. Hence,
the size of K is not of our concern as extra randomness is injected by the stochastic encoder. We continue to assume that no
randomness is introduced inside the network. We show that under this more general model, the characterization of the message
rates remains the same as that in Theorem 5.
The communication model is depicted in Fig. 2. The problem statement is almost the same as that in Section II, with the
only exception that the symbols on the channels is determined by a stochastic matrix. In principle, a stochastic encoder can
be equivalently transformed into a deterministic encoder by introducing an auxiliary random variable which is independent of
the encoder input (cf. p. 141, Yeung [14]). Denote the auxiliary random variable in the block code by Sn, which may depend
on Mn and Kn.
Now, we summarize the conditions that hold when the encoder may be stochastic. At the sender,
I(Mn;Kn) = 0. (74)
The information symbols on the channels satisfy that
H(Y nE |Mn,Kn, Sn) = 0. (75)
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Fig. 2. The Stochastic Encoder.
Since the message Mn can be decoded at the receiver,
H(Mn|Y nE ) = 0. (76)
As required, for each wiretap set Ij ,
H(Mn|Y nIj )
n
≥ Rj , 1 ≤ j ≤ d. (77)
Next, we show that the message rate cannot be increased by using a stochastic encoder, i.e., conditions (16) and (18) – (20)
continue to hold.
It is easy to verify condition (16). Close examination of the proof of Lemma 5 reveals that the lemma remains valid in light
of (74)–(76) (in fact the proof depends only on (76)).
For 1 ≤ i ≤ h, let
ri = H(Y
n
ei |Y n(e1,e2,...,ei−1))/n.
Then
0 ≤ ri ≤ H(Y nei |Y n(el:el∈Ij ,l<i))/n ≤ H(Y nei )/n ≤ Ci,
which is condition (19). By (77) and Lemma 5,
Rj ≤ H(Mn|Y nIj )/n
≤ H(Y nI¯j |Y nIj )/n
=
∑
ei∈I¯j
H(Y nei |Y n(el:l<i), Y nIj )/n
≤
∑
ei∈I¯j
H(Y nei |Y n(el:l<i))/n
=
∑
ei∈I¯j
ri,
which is condition (20). By (76),
RM = H(M
n)/n ≤ H(Y nE )/n =
h∑
i=1
ri,
which is condition (18).
Hence, the message rate cannot be increased by introducing stochastic encoding at the sender.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have obtained a tight rate region for the cooperative imperfect secrecy model in terms of a linear program,
of which the key idea is from the imperfect secrecy theorem. Although the rate region is still open for the general case, our
work has paved the way for further investigation into this problem.
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